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Abstract
China’s censorship infrastructure is widely
recognized
as
sophisticated,
strict,
and
comprehensive. We conducted a qualitative study to
understand Chinese citizens’ practices to navigate
the censored Chinese Internet. We found that
participants’ practices were closely related to their
understanding of and resistance to the censorship
infrastructure. Participants switched between public
and private channels based on the information they
desired to seek. They communicated in ways that
were considered less vulnerable to censorship
examination. They broadened their information
search to mitigate the impact of censored content
consumption. Through these practices, participants
reportedly coped with the censorship infrastructure
in an effective manner. We discuss how this case of
resistance to censorship in China may further our
understanding of such infrastructure.

1. Introduction
China is widely known for its comprehensive,
strict Internet censorship infrastructure [23,34]. In a
top-down manner, the Chinese central government
required that internet companies block keywords,
delete unfavorable contents, and ban infringing users
[3,21]. By imposing hefty penalties for noncomplying organizations, and without providing clear
censorship
parameters,
these entities (e.g.,
microblogs, news sites, and social-networking sites)
are encouraged to develop strict algorithms which
filter results with broad strokes, thus resulting in a
highly restricted informational spaces [13,21].
We carried out a qualitative study to understand
how Chinese citizens resisted the censorship
infrastructure. We conducted 32 semi-structured
interviews with mainland Chinese citizens, and also
observed their discussions on social media. All these
interviewees had discussed three recent political
events in the Chinese social media: The Umbrella
Movement, the National People’s Congress, and the
crackdown on corruption. By focusing on these
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highly politicized events, we had opportunities to
sample more instances of resistance in our data.
We found that participants’ many practices to
deal with censorship involved their understanding of
how the Internet censorship functioned as an
infrastructure. We found a variety of strategies which
usually included users attempting to understand
boundaries, mechanics, and intents of censorship. In
turn, they took measures to avoid, or embrace
censorship, hopefully, to make the best of a
restrictive informational environment. We discuss the
relationship between repression, censorship, and
resistance through the infrastructure lens.

2. Background
China has one of the most sophisticated, strict,
and comprehensive censorship systems in the world
that regulates its Internet infrastructure [21,23].
Among the most well-known of China’s censorship
apparatuses include the Great Firewall, which is the
primary technical means of restricting information
access at the infrastructure level, which includes
blocking undesirable foreign websites such as
Facebook and Twitter, regulating access and
contents, and monitoring Internet use. But China’s
censorship infrastructure also extends to include
online espionage, regulatory tactics, and social
pressure, as MacKinnon, a renowned Internet
freedom advocate and former journalist, described:
Cyber-attacks against activists, dissidents, and Chinese
exiles could compromise their computer networks and
email accounts. Device and network controls involve
pre-installing information filtering and tracking
mechanisms in computers and routers sold in China.
Domain-name controls prevented ordinary individuals
from registering Internet domain names ending in
“.cn.” Localized disconnection and restriction referred
to shutting down connections in specific locations
entirely to ensure that locals cannot use the Internet
or mobile phones to organize protests. Surveillance
works through identity registration for Internet usage,
monitoring software, and the compliance of Internet
companies. The government proactively steers online
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conversations through party members, government
officials, and “fifty-cent party,” people paid to write
posts in favor of their employers. [23]

Therefore, not only does the government controls
the Internet hardware and software networks, it also
imposes a special Internet police force to enforce the
government’s censorship regulations [21,33].
But the most effective effort at restricting
information which emerges at the grassroots level,
including chatrooms, microblogs, and online forums,
perhaps come not from government’s surveillance,
but
self-censorship
of
information
which
organizations and individuals present to their users.
Both domestic and foreign Internet corporations such
as Google [6] and Yahoo [10] altered their search
results to accommodate the state’s censorship
requirements.
And the Chinese government encourages selfcensoring entities to be thorough by intentionally
keeping censorship regulations and guidelines
generic and ambiguous. Roberts, a scholar studying
censorship and propaganda in China, noted:
It is illegal in China to write or distribute any
information online that “harms the interest of the
nation,” “spreads rumors or disturbs social order,”
“insults or defames third parties,” or “jeopardizes the
nation’s unity.” Punishments are similarly ambiguous
and
unevenly
administered—violating
online
information laws could result in punishment as s evere
as jail-time to as trivial as having your account shut
down or simply removing one offending social media
post. The wide range of information that could qualify
under these laws keeps online users in China guess ing
as to what types of information are indeed off-limits
and what types of punishment could be meted out for
spreading the information. [28]

By providing only highly abstract terms such as
national interest, social order, and national unity, the
government affords itself more flexibility of
interpreting and manipulating legal boundaries
[3,21]. Thus, companies which stand to lose much i n
case of a regulatory misstep tend to deploy sweeping
censoring mechanisms to block keywords, ban users,
and delete infringing contents [13,21]. The extent of
self-censorship may intensify during political events,
for example, a case study of keyword blocking on
Weibo reported that, during the 2012 National
Congress election, Weibo actively manipulated and
filtered the search results of certain government
officials’ names [26]. Even citizens in Hong Kong
were worried about the impact of censorship when
they engaged in civic activities [19].
But despite popular beliefs, Chinese citizens still
maintain a small degree of agency in speaking their

minds, as the censorship infrastructure was not
designed to completely remove dissents on its
Internet. In fact, the Chinese government had
investigated citizens’ dissents which at times exposed
corruption and malfeasance at lower level
governments, which contribute to China’s effort at
cracking down on corrupted officials [8]. Rather, a
more important focus for its censorship apparatuses,
than to completely eliminate anti-government
discourses, are to prevent citizens’ collective
mobilization and actions. King, et al. examined
deleted social media content on the Chinese Internet,
arguing that China’s censorship is designed to silence
comments which encouraged or organized social
mobilization; and all forms of mobilization aimed at
spurring offline collective actions were targeted
regardless of their political inclinations [17]. Thus,
Chinese citizens still have limited latitude to conduct
political discourses, so long as they could
successfully guess at the extent of permissible
boundaries.
So far, Chinese citizens’ reactions to the Chinese
censorship apparatuses have been dialectically
complicated. As censorship is continuously
strengthened, Chinese are also making use of proxy
servers and email to access restricted information
[2,22,25]. And citizens have also discussed sensitive
topics using substitute terms for blocked keywords
[16,24]. For example, “ harmony和谐” refers to the
ideology of social harmony proposed during Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s administration (2003-2013).
People use “ river crab 河蟹,” a homophone of
“ harmony 和谐,” to circumvent the block list of
sensitive words [38]. Thus, Roberts suggested that
the Chinese censorship not only had not deterred the
spread of information, it emboldens Internet users to
engage more actively in political writings [28].

3. Related Work
In their seminal work on infrastructure, Star and
Ruhleder state that infrastructure is neither a tool or a
substrate, but a fundamentally relational concept,
which becomes real infrastructure in relation to
organized practices [31]. Infrastructure has the
following properties: embeddedness, transparency,
reach or scope, learned as part of membership, links
with conventions of practice, embodiment of
standards, built on an installed base, becomes visib l e
upon breakdown, and fixed in modular increments,
not all at once or globally [30]. In many ways,
China’s censorship shares such properties. It is sunk
into and inside of the Internet infrastructure, the
organizational arrangements of Internet companies,
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technologies, and artifacts as basic as a router. It has
reach beyond one single site. It is built upon the
existing technical and social structure of the Chinese
Internet. It is constructed gradually.
However, China’s censorship also differs from
the classic conceptualization of infrastructure in
important ways. The design of artifacts often contain
inscribed values [35]. In this case of censorship in
China, it has been deliberately designed and
maintained to control and restrict ordinary citizens,
rather than to support and enable them in the way that
a system of railroad tracks or a city water system
function. It is sometimes transparent but other times
visible when it functions in intended scenarios. It is
learned as people repeatedly encounter and
circumvent it. The repressive nature of China’s
censorship provides us a unique case to reflect upon
the understanding of infrastructure.

4. Method
Our study belongs to a larger project investigating
how Chinese citizens used digital technologies to
understand and discuss political events in China.
From April, 2014 to January, 2016, we conducted 32
interviews with mainland Chinese citizens who were
active posters of political events in China, and thus
were aware of censorship parameters in China and
had experience coping with it.
We recruited our interviewees by first identifying
Internet sites on which we are likely to find active
political posters. We began by registering accounts
on Weibo, the largest Chinese micro-blogging
service. When a major political event broke out, we
used these Weibo’s in-site search functions to search
related keywords in order to locate online debates
and conversations about this event, as well as people
involved in these online discourses. And during the
period of our investigation, three political events took
center stage in these discussions; these include the
Umbrella Movement, the National People’s
Congress, and the crackdown on corruption. The
Umbrella Movement
was
a pro-democracy
movement that took place in Hong Kong from
September, 2014 to December, 2014. The second
event refers to the National People’s Congress’s
annual session that happened in March, 2015. The
third refers to the anti-corruption campaign led by Xi
Jinping, general secretary of the party, which started
in 2012.
We paid particular attention to online celebrities
who showed concern for these political events by
commenting or re-posting relevant content. These
celebrities included scholars, media critics,

economists, and journalists. We identified 20
celebrities with the criteria of having one at least post
that received over 100 comments. Figure 1 shows an
example of a Weibo post with 1341 comments. We
viewed each celebrity’ s micro-blogging page as a site
in an ethnographic sense, because each celebrity’ s
population of followers is relatively stable.
Additionally, we also observed the same group of
people commenting and debating in the comment
area. We archived people’s conversations from the
comment area.
Through the posts of these 20 Weibo celebrities,
we identified a pool of interview candidates who had
posted multiple meaningful and thoughtful
comments. We contacted these people through
Weibo’s private messaging function to ask for an
interview, from which we recruited 32 interviewees.
Our 32 interviewees included 19 males and 13
females between the ages of 18 and 46. They had
diverse occupations, such as graduate student,
government employee, editor, journalist, designer,
engineer, programmer, freelancer, and stock
manager.

Figure 1. A Weibo Post.
All these interviews were conducted in Chinese.
We asked participants how they sought information
regarding certain events and whether they
experienced censorship during these events. We
asked participants about attitudes towards censorship
and why they felt as they did. We asked them to
describe the situations in which they encountered
censorship, and how they coped. We asked how they
learned to circumvent censorship. With permission,
we followed all the participants’ social media
accounts. Some of them followed ours in reciprocity.
The social media platforms included Weibo, and
popular online forums such as tianya.cn and
tiexue.net. On these platforms we observed and
archived participants’ discussion with other social
media users.
The first author is a native Chinese speaker. All
interviews and social media data were translated into
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English by him. We use pseudonyms to protect our
participants’ identity and anonymity.

5. Data Analysis
We adopted a grounded theory approach [5] to
analyze interviews and online discussions. Firstly, we
read all interview transcripts and used our initial
understanding to produce a starting list of codes,
which concern participants’ opinions about
censorship or their strategies to cope with censorship.
From there, we returned to the data to conduct a
systematic analysis of the themes that emerged. After
several iterations of coding, we identified three
concrete methods that our participants used to resist
the censorship infrastructure. The three methods are:
switching between public and private channels, using
machine unreadable message, and broadening
information search. We then returned to our data set
to find episodes [29] where participants described
their strategies of resistance. We paid particular
attention to their reasoning processes behind adopting
a particular strategy.

6. Findings
In this section, we detailed participants’ strategies
to navigate information allowed by censorship on the
Chinese Internet. One, participants have used
alternative backchannels. Two, they have presented
information in creative ways. And three, they have
pieced together information from multiple, local and
foreign, sources to reassemble the complete picture.

6.1. Re serving Sensitive Information for
Pri vate an d Backchannel Discussion
Most of our participants, from their experiences
navigating the Chinese Internet, have perceived that
the use of government censorship apparatuses is more
evident on popular websites, as well as many-tomany public channels (e.g., Weibo). Their
experiences with government censorship usually
involved uninformed and sudden manipulation of
public information, such as: they were suddenly
unable to visit a particular news website; they could
not enter a previously admissible keyword search
term into a search field; they found particular content
on social media to be deleted; and they saw
suspicious comments which they believed were
posted by paid commentators hired by the
government. Through such in-situ experiences,
Chinese Internet users observed and guessed at what

is permissible by censorship, and learned what they
should not say publicly. They kept this sensitive
information off the public record and only to be
shared through private backchannels, such as in
instant messaging and private chats. For example,
Ling, a magazine editor, said:
I think the government only banned keywords in
places where a lot of people can read and talk. When I
used blogging services a while ago, I had to make sure
there was no sensitive word in my articles each
containing hundreds of words. However, I have never
had to worry about this problem [word checking]
when chatting in a private channel.

QQ and WeChat are the most popular instant
messaging tools in China [4]. Tianya.cn is one of the
largest online forum. And Mingyue, a graduate
student, said:
They [the government and the owners of s ocial media
platforms] don’t really care about what we say in
instant mess aging tools such as QQ and WeChat, or
private chat on Weibo and tianya.cn.

While the extent of Internet information which
the Chinese government intends to censor remains
unclear, Chinese users tended to believe censorship
does not apply to private chat channels, as
Zhongfeng, a 27-year-old designer, told us:
It’s very hard to monitor all the private
communication. There will be too much content to
censor. Also in private chat we don’t type in formal
Chinese, which makes censorship even harder to work.

Under the pervasive surveillance, our participants
generally perceived private channels to contain more
reliable information than public channels, which
tended to be generic and shallow. Thus, serious
information seekers had often directly asked for
information from people who they believed had
sensitive information. For example, Baozi, a 20-yearold college student, mentioned that he had friends
who studied at Hong Kong during the period of the
Umbrella Movement. He could often see his friends’
social media posts about the movement, such as
pictures or related news report. He told us:
Yeah, I initially learned about the movement from my
friends’ posts in WeChat’s Friend Circle. But they
didn’t really post many details of the movement,
except a few pictures and very brief comments. Maybe
it is kind of sensitive to talk in the public. For example,
if I asked a question in their posts ’ comment area,
most likely they would answer briefly with some joking
language. But I got really interested in this and chatted
with them privately, they began to talk a lot about
their experiences with the movement, such as class
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boycott activities and protesting in Hong Kong’s
business district.

Baozi found private channels to be more effective
at obtaining information from his friends; he thus
resorted to private channels in order to obtain a better
picture.
Our participants reported that in some social
media circles, such as on Weibo, users were mostly
willing to share information privately, even with
strangers, so long as this happened away from public
eye. Zhongfeng described this open mindset
regarding Weibo information sharing:
In Weibo discus sions, I often come across novel and
insightful ideas that I have never heard before. Some
of the ideas refer to sensitive information, such as the
relationship between Hong Kong’s capitalists and highranking central government officials. There will never
be reports like this in the domestic media because of
censorship. If I am interested in that piece of sensitive
information, I will send a private mess age to the user
and ask for it. Most of the time, the user is willing to
share it. I do the same thing if I have certain sensitive
information and another person asks for it.

Zhongfeng’s story signified how Chinese Internet
practices changed to develop new informational
pathways (i.e., a network of private backchannels)
which can partially counter the influence of the
censorship infrastructure. This backchannel replaced
normative participation in Habermas’ sense of public
sphere [7,11], and traversed a longer and secured
route perceived as off the censorship radar. We are
unable to know the extent this information
“ rerouting” diminishes public discourses, but what i s
interesting is the emergence of consensus among
Weibo users making such forms of information
sharing
plausible.
Private and backchannel
discussions signified how Chinese citizens came to
understand the boundaries of Internet censorship and
figure out the venues that the censorship
infrastructure does not reach.

6.2. Expre ssing in Machine Unreadable Ways
A common perception among our participants
was that many censorship mechanisms relied on basic
keyword filtering techniques to manage the massive,
ever-increasing amount of information that was being
produced and circulated in the Chinese Internet. To
counter this mechanism, participants attempted to
make communications difficult to read or delete by
either algorithms or human. For example, Zhongfeng
believed that censorship mechanisms typically
followed a set of simplistic reasoning, such as to
identify a set of sensitive keywords:

[The government’s] methods are relatively brutal, such
as enforcing the sensitive word list. But you know, who
really talk in formal language online?

What Zhongfeng pointed out was also reported in
previous studies on how Chinese users were able to
use uncensored terms to express the same politicized
meanings without being censored [27,34,37]. What is
important here is that the Chinese users have evolved
their Internet expressions in ways faster than
censorship could keep up.
One way which participants could bypass
censorship was to render text as bitmaps, a form of
content which current censorship mechanisms could
not read (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Image-based Content.
Yuming, a 23-year-old college student, enjoyed
using images for opinion expression. He said:
I absolutely love it. I can say something that would be
deleted otherwise. I can also be more express ive with
images, like using some interesting fonts or adding
some Internet meme pictures.

While it took effort to produce such images,
participants found them useful when they deemed the
content sensitive.
The second way was to post sensitive information
only on temporary “ throwaway” accounts [20]. While
censorship could pick up accounts which have been
posting sensitive information, and ban these
accounts, it has yet to be able to trace the identity of
the real user—if such person manages to move from
one account to another. Here is an excerpt of a social
media conversation:
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Feitu: You are very knowledgeable. I will have to admit
that I know little about the movement. Can you send
some information to me through private mess ages if it
is convenient for you? I want to know more.
Wuhui: You should follow a Weibo account titled
huaxia (“华夏”). This person often publishes precise
analysis, and I believe he knows a lot of sensitive
information. However, Weibo often bans his account,
probably because he leaks too much information. To
counter account suspension from Weibo, he has
created a primary Weibo account that regularly
publishes his newly registered accounts. Once you
have followed this account, he will tell you the name
of his primary account in private mess ages. If you can
follow his primary account, you will always know his
latest Weibo account for leaking sensitive information.

In this conversation, Wuhui talked about a
successful approach employed by huaxia in which his
master account was used to publish the usernames of
throwaway accounts; and these throwaway accounts
were used to publish sensitive information. His
master account had never been banned since it did
not directly post this information. Such approach
outwitted the current censoring mechanism and
allowed the audience to continue to receive sensitive
information.
The third way was to obtain information from
lesser known websites. Participants pointed out that
many websites which have been aggregating news
from blocked foreign websites had published
materials without the government knowledge. For
example, qimila.com was a Chinese video sharing
forum where people shared downloaded news videos
from blocked foreign websites such as YouTube.
These videos often involved sensitive topics in
China. Another powerful website was Long Teng
Wang (“ 龙腾网”) (www.ltaaa.com/), where Chinese
citizens voluntarily translated and shared many
countries’ reports about China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan. Leiyu, a 21-year-old college student,
highlighted the value of these aggregation websites:
I often use a number of channels to obtain
information. For example, search Long Teng Wang on
the Internet. This is a translation forum… I know many
powerful websites like this. Therefore, I do not rely on
Weibo for information.

Leiyu’s story signified the existence of alternative
websites that allowed the access to rich content
unseen in mainstream media sites, although in a
much more complex way.

6.3. Pi e cing th e Puzzle Through Broad-base d
Information Search

Despite having ways to circumvent and bypass
censorship, our participants still found value in
consuming censored information, especially if each
piece of information contributes to forming the
complete story. And our participants judged the value
of censored information in the following ways.
One, if the reported event was of little political
value, its related news was likely to be accurate, as a
participant said:
For events with lower priority, I am fine with just
reading the state media. I do not necess arily trust
what the state media says.

Two, even for strictly censored content on state
media, our participants had found it useful to deduce
the premise of that information being reported—by
drawing on the circumstances in which the
information is being presented. For example, Gushi, a
46-year-old stock manager, said:
I watch Xinwen Lianbo every day to inform my
investment decisions. I try to infer which industry the
central government favors.

Three, when our participants read local censored
news from different outlets, they could also identify
subtle differences which complemented what each
outlet had de-emphasized. And Mafei, a 29-year-old
engineer, enjoyed reading a number of mainlandbased newspapers on a weekly basis. Due to China
enforcing vague self-censorship regulations, each
media outlet might interpret what is considered
sensitive information differently. And he found a
variety of competing opinions even on these media.
He also considered social media such as Weibo and
WeChat as complementary to state media.
Finally, our participants looked beyond each
information source by reading broadly, while piecing
together different information to form a coherent
picture. Some of them even gathered information
from foreign sources, so as to form a more complete
picture of social and political events. For example,
Zhelu, a 37-year-old writer, watched state-owned
television channels for daily entertainment and news.
But he was also a 15-year customer of several Hong
Kong television channels because of their alternative
analyses of international and domestic affairs. He
also logged on to Facebook and T witter, via VPN, t o
learn about his Western friends’ opinions. While
acknowledging the quality of information they
obtained from Western sources, our participants also
stressed that even foreign-based and Western news
media have their biases, as Leiyu commented:
Knowing each media’s pros and cons and taking
advantage of this knowledge is necess ary to
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understanding what’s really going on in an event. In
the end, if you do enough homework, censorship
won’t matter much.

By developing a rich understanding of each
media’s pros and cons, our participants developed
their own taxonomies of media outlets—with their
complementary biases and perspectives—in order to
piece the puzzles of political biases on the Internet.
Participants were confident that censorship could not
stop them from obtaining desired information.

7. Discussion
We reported a qualitative study of a group of
Chinese citizens’ practices of resisting censorship
that is pervasive in the Chinese Internet. Our
participants utilized many different strategies at
circumventing, outwitting, and looking beyond
censored information. For example, they learned
what information was best conveyed in private
instant messaging, rather than an online forum. Some
Weibo users even developed trust with each other in
relaying information through private messaging.
Other such social practices include the use of nonmachine readable images and news aggregate with
deductive reasoning. Through these social practices,
the citizens were able to broaden their information
accessibility beyond what is prescribed by
censorship. Next we will discuss how this case study
might advance our understanding of the censorship
infrastructure as well as infrastructural resistance.

7.1. Characterizing Re pressive Infrastructure
Previous studies have primarily examined
infrastructures designed to enable people and serve
society [1,12,31]. China’s censorship presents a
unique case where a sophisticated system has been
built and maintained at a national scale with the sole
purpose of controlling and limiting every ordinary
citizen.
The censorship infrastructure possesses a few
unique characteristics. First, its goal is to set
boundaries, rather than to support and to empower. In
order to do so, the censorship infrastructure operates
in a top-down manner. The central government sends
out orders and decisions while corporations and
government agencies execute these instructions.
Second, it becomes visible whenever people cross
the boundaries, such as searching a sensitive keyword
or visiting a blocked site.
Third, the censorship infrastructure is meant to be
opaque. No ordinary citizen should know its
standards and mechanism. Our participants might

observe a blocked foreign website or a forbidden
search engine keyword. However, they would never
know the precise list of blocked websites or the
sensitive keyword list. Remaining an opaque artifact,
the infrastructure could easily extend its influence
beyond its reach, since participants could not be
completely certain whether they were being watched.
Internet companies are likely to censor more than
they have to in order to limit their exposure to
regulatory infringements.
The well-known existence of such a massive
repressive infrastructure might be possible in
centralized regimes that are able to execute top-down
methods of control, with the compliance of
companies and organizations. However, repressive
infrastructures might exist at varied scales in different
societies, only becoming visible when they
malfunction in an unexpected way, as evidenced by
the Snowden case and NSA’s massive surveillance
effort [9]. Additionally, there might be a repressive
side of our everyday infrastructures. Such concern
increases when infrastructures fall into private hands
that are not subject to public eyes. The infrastructure
that ordinary citizens rely on for information and
news consumption is worth research attention [18].
For example, Internet companies such as Google,
Twitter, and Facebook are gaining enormous power
in today’s internet infrastructure, as a substantial
portion of the Internet traffic flows through these
Internet giants’ sites [36]. Google, for example, has
been frequently cited for its discriminating
algorithms [14,15]. Facebook was reported to
manipulate its trending topics to favor the
Democratic Party in the US [32].
Studying repressive infrastructure can be
challenging. In this study, there has been no open,
official documentation regarding how censorship is
implemented and maintained, what entities
participate, and what technologies are designed and
utilized. Therefore, we were hardly able to follow
Star’s recommendations [30] to identify master
narratives or surface invisible work. Instead, we
analyzed people’s encounters and experiences with
censorship, as well as their interpretations of how
censorship worked. The secretive nature of such
infrastructure and the proper approach to it are worth
further investigation by infrastructure researchers.

7.2.
Understanding
Re sistance

Infrastru ctu ral

Much learning took place as Chinese citizens
became used to the pervasiveness of censorship.
They had to learn the advantages and disadvantages
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of different venues. Because of the opaqueness of
censorship, participants mostly built knowledge
through incidental observations of censorship as well
as chatting with other citizens.
Participants’ infrastructural resistance involved
three parties—companies developing authoritative
mechanisms with over-reaching censorship, the
censorship authority imposing vague censorship
regulations with hidden boundaries, and citizens
performing resistance by pushing informational
boundaries presented. The nature of this resistance is
not to disregard the entirety of government’s
censorship, but to navigate the gray areas between
“ censored information” and the “ level of information
(actually) permissible by censorship.” Citizens make
use of social media to access and transmit
information beyond what was permissible by
censorship. Yet, information that has been shared by
overriding intents and designs of censorship may not
have exceeded what the government intend on
suppressing. As discussed by Roberts [28], and also
mentioned by our participants, the extent of Chinese
government censorship may be aimed at disallowing
public gatherings and collective actions, and perhaps
for this reason, the censorship apparatuses had not
been extended to less popular websites and instant
messaging tools.
Participants’ infrastructural resistance was a
collaborative effort that involved both friends and
strangers. Participants had friends who located
outside the censorship infrastructure and had easy
access to sensitive information. They also felt free to
ask strangers for information. Participants were
confident that, as long as they have access to the
Internet, they will be able to find any desired
information by collaborating and communicating
with other people. We attribute such confidence to
the ubiquitous Internet infrastructure that is
composed of various ways of communication and
massive numbers of organizations and people.
Embedded in the Internet infrastructure, repressive
infrastructures do not have absolute control over
information and resistance is possible.

8. Conclusion
In this paper we reported a qualitative study of a
group of Chinese citizens coping with China’s
Internet censorship infrastructure. By analyzing
participants’ three concrete strategies to navigate the
censored Chinese Internet, we were not stating that
such strategies were common and usual among our
participants. Moreover, we do not see repression as
the only characteristic of China’s censorship. Rather,

the paper is intended to explore the relationship
between resistance, repression, and infrastructure,
without either supporting or denouncing censorship.
We showed how a repressive censorship
infrastructure worked as participants experienced it,
as well as how infrastructural resistance was possible
through individual agency and social collaboration.
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